Supreme Court Acquits Imelda Marcos in Graft Case, Separates Criminal Liability From Swiss Wealth Ruling

 

The Supreme Court’s acquittal of former first lady Imelda Marcos in seven graft cases has revived questions about how the decision fits with earlier court rulings involving the Marcos family’s Swiss assets.

The apparent contradiction disappears once the two sets of cases are examined for what they actually decided. The latest ruling concerned criminal liability, where prosecutors must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The earlier Swiss deposits case was a civil forfeiture proceeding, which applied a different legal standard and addressed whether specific assets constituted ill-gotten wealth.

In its decision dated June 10, 2026, but publicly released on September 9, the Supreme Court overturned Imelda Marcos’ 2018 Sandiganbayan conviction, citing fundamental weaknesses in the prosecution’s evidence and in the legal basis used to establish several of the graft charges.

The decision focused heavily on the failure to authenticate crucial Swiss financial records, the lack of competent witnesses who could testify about their authenticity and execution, and the prosecution’s inability to demonstrate that the foundations involved qualified as businesses under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The ruling also identified a constitutional issue in four of the cases, finding that Marcos had effectively been convicted under a public capacity different from the one specified in the charges.

The Swiss deposits are a separate legal question

The most important distinction is that the Supreme Court has previously ruled against the Marcoses over the Swiss funds themselves.

In a 2003 civil forfeiture case, the high court ordered the forfeiture of approximately $658.2 million in Swiss deposits, including interest, in favor of the Philippine government. The funds had originally totaled about $356 million and were held through several foreign foundations.

The court found that the amount was grossly disproportionate to the Marcos couple’s known lawful income, which was placed at approximately $304,372.43 during Ferdinand Marcos’ presidency. The Marcoses also failed to demonstrate that the funds had been legally acquired.

Some of the foreign foundations involved in that earlier proceeding overlap with entities cited in the more recent criminal cases against Imelda Marcos.

However, the 2003 judgment did not establish Imelda Marcos’ criminal guilt for the offenses considered in the 2026 decision. Civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution are separate legal proceedings with different requirements.

That distinction is central to understanding why the government can retain a final forfeiture judgment concerning particular assets while a criminal prosecution involving those same entities can nevertheless fail.

Weak documentation undermined the prosecution

The Supreme Court found that the government did not meet the evidentiary requirements necessary to sustain Marcos’ criminal convictions.

At the center of the problem were Swiss documents submitted to prove the financial arrangements involving the foundations.

The court determined that the records had not been properly authenticated. Several government witnesses could explain how the documents came into government possession, but they lacked firsthand knowledge about how the documents were created, executed or whether their contents were genuine.

Among those who could establish the chain of custody or government possession were former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, former Philippine ambassador to Switzerland Luis Ascalon and an officer who handled records for the Presidential Commission on Good Government.

That was not enough.

Without a qualified witness who could attest to the authenticity and proper execution of the Swiss records, the documents could not carry the evidentiary weight required in a criminal prosecution. The court further found that their contents constituted hearsay and did not acquire sufficient probative value simply by being presented in court.

The issue illustrates a fundamental principle of criminal litigation: evidence can be highly consequential yet legally unusable if it is not introduced through the proper evidentiary process.

Foundations were not automatically considered businesses

The prosecution also encountered a problem in proving that the foreign foundations fell within the category of businesses contemplated by the anti-graft statute.

The Sandiganbayan had viewed the foundations’ financial activities, including maintaining bank accounts, moving funds and generating investment income, as sufficient indicators of entrepreneurial activity.

The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning.

Financial transactions alone, the court found, do not necessarily transform an entity into a commercial enterprise. The prosecution needed to establish that the foundations operated as businesses within the specific meaning required by the law.

The court also noted that the absence of charitable activity does not automatically mean an organization is a business.

This became particularly significant because several foundations, including Maler, Trinidad, Rayby and Avertina, were established under Liechtenstein law. Prosecutors failed to present the foreign laws necessary to establish the legal character and status of those entities.

Without that foundation, the prosecution could not sufficiently prove an essential element of the charges.

Four counts faced an additional constitutional defect

The Supreme Court identified another problem involving four of the seven graft cases.

The charges concerning the Maler, Trinidad, Rayby and Palmy foundations were filed against Marcos based on her position as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa.

The Sandiganbayan, however, ultimately relied on a constitutional restriction applicable to Cabinet members when it convicted her.

That distinction was legally significant because the 1973 Constitution imposed different restrictions depending on the public position held.

A criminal defendant cannot be convicted on a theory materially different from the accusation formally brought against her. Doing so can interfere with the constitutional right to know the nature and cause of the charges.

For the Supreme Court, that was not a minor technicality. It affected the legal foundation of the convictions themselves.

2018 Sandiganbayan conviction overturned

The decision effectively erased the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division’s 2018 conviction on seven graft counts.

Those cases involved Maler Establishment and the Trinidad, Rayby, Palmy, Vibur, Aguamina and Avertina foundations.

The original penalties were severe. Marcos had been sentenced to six years and one month to 11 years of imprisonment for each count, along with perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

The cases formed part of 10 graft charges filed against her beginning in 1991. She had already been acquitted in the remaining three cases by the Sandiganbayan.

The Supreme Court’s latest ruling now removes the criminal convictions attached to the seven counts.

But it does not amount to a judicial declaration that the wealth associated with the foundations was lawfully obtained.

A ruling about proof, not a declaration on the Marcos wealth

The Supreme Court explicitly limited the scope of its decision.

Its ruling addressed whether prosecutors had successfully established Imelda Marcos’ criminal liability under the anti-graft law. It did not resolve whether assets connected to the foundations should be classified as ill-gotten wealth.

That issue remains governed by separate civil proceedings, including the earlier final judgment concerning the Swiss deposits.

The distinction can be understood much like two different questions about the same property. One proceeding asks whether the government can legally take possession of an asset under a civil forfeiture case. Another asks whether a particular individual has been proven guilty of a specific crime beyond reasonable doubt. The answers do not necessarily have to be identical.

The Marcos Swiss wealth ruling therefore remains distinct from the 2026 criminal acquittal.

The Supreme Court’s message was ultimately about the limits of judicial decision-making. Courts cannot substitute suspicion, historical controversy or even strongly held beliefs for evidence that satisfies the rules of criminal procedure.

In this case, the prosecution’s failure to properly authenticate key records, establish the legal status of the foundations and prove the charges under the correct constitutional framework was enough to prevent the criminal convictions from standing.

For the government, the ruling underscores a longstanding challenge in Marcos-era litigation: even potentially significant allegations can fail in court when evidence is not presented in a form the law permits judges to rely upon.